epiphenomenalism उदाहरण वाक्य

उदाहरण वाक्य

1. Epiphenomenalism is a form of Property Dualism, in which it is asserted that one or more mental states do not have any influence on physical states ( both ontologically and causally irreducible ).
2. He also argues all examples of spandrels, pendentives, corbels and squinches do actually serve a function; they are necessary to achieve something, but that necessity is exactly what epiphenomenalism denies.
3. Benjamin Libet's results are quoted in favor of epiphenomenalism, but he believes subjects still have a " conscious veto ", since the readiness potential does not invariably lead to an action.
4. Non-reductive physicalism is therefore often categorised as property dualism rather than monism, yet other types of property dualism do not adhere to the causal reducibility of mental states ( see epiphenomenalism ).
5. Davidson argued that anomalous monism follows from three plausible theses Firstly, he assumes the " denial of epiphenomenalism ", the denial of the view that mental events do not cause physical events.
6. According to epiphenomenalism, mental states like Pierre's pleasurable experience or, at any rate, their distinctive qualia are epiphenomena; they are side-effects or by-products of physical processes in the body.
7. Some philosophers, such as Dennett, reject both epiphenomenalism and the existence of qualia with the same charge that Gilbert Ryle leveled against a Cartesian " ghost in the machine ", that they too are category mistakes.
8. Although it does not entail substance dualism, according to Green, epiphenomenalism implies a one-way form of interactionism that is just as hard to conceive of as the two-way form embodied in substance dualism.
9. Since Davidson believes that mental events are causally efficacious ( i . e . he rejects epiphenomenalism ), then it must be a mental event as such ( mental properties of mental events ) which are the causally relevant properties.
10. Epiphenomenalism is the theory in philosophy of mind that mental phenomena are caused by physical processes in the brain or that both are effects of a common cause, as opposed to mental phenomena driving the physical mechanics of the brain.